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SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS: THE
NEED FOR A THIRD SENTENCING OPTION
IN WISCONSIN
In light of the “Slenderman” trial, it has become abundantly clear that a
gap exists between the sentencing options available for “Class A” juvenile offenders and “Class
B” juvenile offenders. This Comment proposes an expanded sentencing
option for “Class B” serious juvenile offenders under the Juvenile Justice Code
to allow those “Class B” serious juvenile offenders the benefit of extended supervision in the Serious Juvenile Offender Program as is available to “Class
A” serious juvenile offenders currently. This expansion aims to alleviate the
concern that certain “Class B” serious juvenile offenders must remain under
original adult court jurisdiction in order to allow a longer period of supervision
than is currently available to those “Class B” serious juvenile offenders in juvenile court.
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INTRODUCTION

In May 2014, two twelve-year-old girls inspired by the Internet character
“Slenderman” were charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide
after stabbing their friend nineteen times and leaving her in the woods to die.1
The “Slenderman” trial, as the case has come to be known, has drawn national
attention because the girls were found competent to stand trial as adults due to
the severity of their offense.2 State law requires the two twelve-year-old girls
be charged as adults, because Wisconsin Statutes section 938.183(1)(am) gives
the adult court jurisdiction over all persons ten years or over who attempted or
committed first-degree intentional homicide (“Class A” felony), first-degree
reckless homicide (“Class B” felony), or second-degree intentional homicide
(“Class B” felony).3 In the reverse waiver hearing to consider whether the girls
should be transferred to juvenile court the presiding judge refused to move the
cases to juvenile court stating on record that he believed a transfer would depreciate the seriousness of the crime.4 Under the juvenile system, “the girls
would face only three years of incarceration and extensive supervision until age
18,” which the judged viewed as an inappropriate sentence.5 This case sheds
light on concerns about how to prosecute juvenile offenders that commit especially heinous crimes, namely, whether juvenile offenders are best served under
the juvenile justice code or need to be prosecuted under the adult criminal code.6
In Wisconsin, the type of offense committed by a juvenile dictates classification.7 A juvenile can commit a large variety of offenses that are categorized

1. Jason Hanna & Dana Ford, Police: Wisconsin Girl, 12, Stabbed 19 Times; Friends Arrested,
CNN (June 2, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/02/justice/wisconsin-girl-stabbed/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8QUC-6DWL].
2. Bruce Vielmetti, Girls in Slender Man Stabbing Case to Remain in Adult Court, MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL SENTINEL, (Aug. 10, 2015), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/crime/girls-in-slender-manstabbing-case-to-remain-in-adult-court-b99553843z1-321293491.html
[https://perma.cc/JJ6PH6NW].
3. WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1)(am) (2013–2014).
4. Vielmetti, supra note 2.
5. Vielmetti, supra note 2; WIS. STAT. § 970.032(2)(a)–(c) (2013–2014) stating that the adult
court may reverse waive a child to juvenile court if the child proves by the preponderance of evidence
(a) That, if convicted, the juvenile could not receive adequate treatment in the
criminal justice system. (b) That transferring jurisdiction to the court assigned to
exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 and 938 would not depreciate the seriousness
of the offense. (c) That retaining jurisdiction is not necessary to deter the juvenile
or other juveniles from committing the violation of which the child is accused
under the circumstances specified in s. 938.183(1)(a), (am), (ar), (b), or (c),
whichever is applicable.
6. Vielmetti, supra note 2.
7. WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1)(a)–(c).
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as different classes of felonies, which will subsequently dictate the sentencing
options available to the judge; however, only “Class A” and “Class B” offenses
are relevant to this Comment.8 The “Class A” distinction is only given to those
juveniles charged with first–degree intentional homicide, and under “Class A”
a juvenile who is placed in the “Serious Juvenile Offender Program” can be
held in secure custody in a juvenile correctional facility up until his or her
twenty-fifth birthday.9 Unlike “Class A,” the “Class B” serious juvenile offenders, including those charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, second-degree intentional homicide, or first-degree reckless homicide,
can only be held in secure custody in a juvenile correctional facility for up to
three years.10 This limit on placement may deter the adult court from finding a
transfer to juvenile court jurisdiction appropriate and require the adult court,
instead, to retain exclusive jurisdiction if it finds a longer sentence is necessary
to deter the juvenile and protect the public.11
This Comment explores the gap that exists between sentencing options for
those serious juvenile offenders classified as “Class A” and those classified as
“Class B.” It focuses exclusively on the need for expanded sentencing options
for “Class B” serious juvenile offenders, largely, in order to avoid the concern
that courts should maintain adult jurisdiction. The Serious Juvenile Offender
Program only offers three years of supervision for “Class B” offenders and because there is no option for extended placement, the only available alternative
is placement under adult court jurisdiction.12
First, this Comment will outline the history of Wisconsin’s Juvenile Justice
8. WIS. STAT. § 940.01(1)(a) (2013–2014) states that “[e]xcept as provided in sub. (2), whoever
causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class
A felony”; WIS. STAT. §939.32(1)(a) (2013–2014) states “[w]hoever attempts to commit a crime for
which the penalty is life imprisonment is guilty of a Class B felony.”
9. WIS. STAT. § 940.01(1)(a); WIS. STAT. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m) (2013–2014) states:
If the participant has been adjudicated delinquent for committing an act that
would be a Class A felony if committed by an adult, placement in a Type 1 juvenile correctional facility or a secured residential care center for children and youth
until the participant reaches 25 years of age, unless the participant is released
sooner, subject to a mandatory minimum period of confinement of not less than
one year.
State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶120, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 N.W.2d 144 (noting that the dispositional order
for extended placement for serious juvenile offenders only applies to those juveniles given dispositional order before their eighteenth birthday).
10. WIS. STAT. § 939.32(1)(a) (2013–2014); WIS. STAT. § 938.538(3)(a)(1) (2013–2014) states
that the following sanction can be given”[s]ubject to subd. 1m., placement in a Type 1 juvenile correctional facility or a secured residential care center for children and youth for a period of not more than
3 years.”
11. Vielmetti, supra note 2.
12. § 938.538(3)(a)(1).
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Code and discuss the relevant legislative history of Wisconsin Statutes section
938.183(1)(am) beginning with the creation of the Juvenile Justice code in
1996.13 Additionally, it will discuss the relevant Supreme Court cases and Wisconsin case law to highlight the distinction between adult and juvenile sentencing.14 Second, this Comment will discuss the creation of the Serious Juvenile
Offender program and highlight the sentencing options for those juveniles who
are considered serious juvenile offenders.15 Last, this Comment will demonstrate the need for a third option for “Class B” serious juvenile offenders.
Wisconsin’s need for extended placement options for “Class B” serious juvenile offenders has become more apparent since the waiver proceedings of the
Slenderman case have begun. This Comment will demonstrate why the Wisconsin legislature should create more sentencing options for judges regarding
serious juvenile offenders. Specifically, Wisconsin should consider extending
the ability to hold serious juvenile offenders until the age of twenty-five to those
classified as “Class B” offenders and not just limit that option to those classified
as “Class A” offenders. Where both “Class A” and “Class B” offenders are
considered serious juvenile offenders and are subject to original adult court jurisdiction for criminal proceedings, the options available to a judge during sentencing should be similar and not distinguished by whether the violent act was
simply attempted or completed.16 Instead, “Class B” offenders are often subject
to adult court jurisdiction because there are increased sentencing options available to meet concerns addressed in reverse waiver hearings and may in turn be
forced to serve a much harsher sentence.17
This Comment does not focus on the differences between adolescent and
post-adolescent brain development in judgment or impulse control, nor does it
aim to highlight whether juvenile offenders should be treated as fully culpable
adults.18 While this Comment recognizes the contrast between the environment, treatment, and consequences of adult and juvenile correctional systems

13. Marygold S. Melli, Symposium: Juvenile Justice Reform: Introduction: Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 375.
14. Id.; Jaime L. Preciado, Special Issue: Comment, The Right to a Juvenile Jury Trial in Wisconsin: Rebalancing the Balanced Approach, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 571. See generally Katherine Hunt
Federle, Symposium: Juvenile Justice Reform: Emancipation and Execution: Transferring Children to
Criminal Court in Capital Cases, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 447.
15. See generally Kenneth M. Streit & John T. Chisholm, Expand Sentencing Options for Young
Adults, WIS. LAW., May 2013, at 38.
16. §§ 938.183(1)(am), 938.538(3)(a)(1)–(1m).
17. Vielmetti, supra note 2; State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶ 46, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 N.W.2d 144.
18. See generally Melissa S. Caulum, Comment, Postadolescent Brain Development: A Disconnect Between Neuroscience, Emerging Adults, and the Corrections System, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 729.
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and in part relies on the research regarding the opportunities a juvenile correctional facility offers, the main purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate the
gap that exists in sentencing serious juvenile offenders that are classified as
“Class B” offenders.19
In Part I, the Comment explores the history of juvenile justice codes as a
separate system for prosecuting juvenile offenders including its deviation from
the traditional adult court criminal proceedings and the Juvenile Justice Code
in Wisconsin. Part II discusses the use of waiver and reverse waiver proceedings for severe offenses that fall under original, exclusive adult jurisdiction.
Additionally, this Part will discuss the Serious Juvenile Offender Program created by Wisconsin Statutes section 938.538 and the sentencing options available to court depending on the age of the offender and the nature of the offense,
namely, whether the offense is classified as a “Class A” or “Class B” felony.
This Part also demonstrates how different offenses have different sentencing
options under the Juvenile Justice Code. Part III details a proposed “third option” for serious juvenile offenders that commit a “Class B” felony. Specifically, Part III suggests an extended placement option in the juvenile proceedings rather than limiting the judge’s sentencing discretion to three-year
sentences under juvenile jurisdiction or potentially harsher sentences (up to
sixty years)20 under adult criminal court jurisdiction.

19. Id.; § 938.538(3).
20. WIS. STAT. § 939.50(3) (2013–2014):
(3) Penalties for felonies are as follows:
(a) For a Class A felony, life imprisonment.
(b) For a Class B felony, imprisonment not to exceed 60 years.
(c) For a Class C felony, a fine not to exceed 100,000 or imprisonment not to
exceed 40 years, or both.
(d) For a Class D felony, a fine not to exceed 100,000 or imprisonment not
to exceed 25 years, or both.
(e) For a Class E felony, a fine not to exceed 50,000 or imprisonment not to
exceed 15 years, or both.
(f) For a Class F felony, a fine not to exceed 25,000 or imprisonment not to
exceed 12 years and 6 months, or both.
(g) For a Class G felony, a fine not to exceed 25,000 or imprisonment not to
exceed 10 years, or both.
(h) For a Class H felony, a fine not to exceed 10,000 or imprisonment not to
exceed 6 years, or both.
(i) For a Class I felony, a fine not to exceed 10,000 or imprisonment not to
exceed 3 years and 6 months, or both.
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II. HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CODE IN WISCONSIN
A. Creation of Juvenile Correctional Systems in America
In 1899, the first juvenile corrections system was established in Cook
County, Illinois, as a response to the increasingly prevalent concern that juveniles were vulnerable and more likely to commit delinquent acts.21 The idea
was to create a juvenile court distinct from the criminal court with a focus on
rehabilitation, rather than punishment.22 Instead of sentencing juveniles to
prison, the juveniles were committed to institutions where the primary goal was
to intervene and provide correctional treatment that would help prevent juveniles from committing more delinquent or criminal acts in the future.23 Thus,
the juvenile court itself began to take part in the rehabilitation process as it began its early intervention efforts for children at risk, which included neglected
or delinquent juveniles.24
In the juvenile court system, the judges were granted discretion to make
individualized treatment decisions for each juvenile.25 Under the doctrine of
parens patriae, the juvenile court decisions replaced the decisions of natural
parents who were unable or unwilling to intervene in delinquent or neglected
children’s lives.26 These juvenile proceedings were viewed as “civil” in nature,
where it removed juveniles from the adult criminal system into a system that
offered more flexible treatments.27 The goal was to provide individual, flexible
treatment that focused on the child’s needs rather than the crime.28 This goal
was furthered by the rejection of traditional criminal prosecution procedures;
instead, juvenile courts eliminated juries, stopped applying the rules of evidence, created private proceedings, and labeled juveniles “delinquent” rather
than “guilty” of a specific crime.29 After a delinquency finding, the juvenile

21. Caulum, supra note 18, at 747; Preciado, supra note 14, at 576 (“[J]uveniles, because of their
age, were more vulnerable and led astray more easily than adults.”).
22. Preciado, supra note 14, at 576 (“The punitive approach was too limited for a court that
looked holistically at the situation of the youth, as opposed to a criminal law system that focused on
punishment and the protection of society.”).
23. Id. (suggesting that the juvenile justice courts were founded under a belief that “youths were
amenable to change”).
24. Melli, supra note 13, at 379 (highlighting that the juvenile court was intended for all problems
with children).
25. Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69
MINN. L. REV. 141, 147–48 (1984).
26. Id. at 148.
27. Id. at 149.
28. Id. at 150.
29. Id. at 150–51.
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was committed to an institution for correction, where the juvenile was to either
be released after rehabilitation or kept in custody until the juvenile reached the
age of majority.30
While the objective of juvenile court was early intervention for minor criminal or delinquent conduct, there was little consideration as to how the juvenile
court would address serious juvenile crime.31 As a result, many states gave
criminal courts jurisdiction over more serious offenses, especially those crimes
considered to be felonies.32 This distinction between delinquent offenses and
more serious offenses meant that a prosecutor’s charging decision ultimately
determined whether the juvenile would be subjected to the traditional criminal
court proceedings or juvenile court proceedings.33 A child under juvenile court
jurisdiction would not be subject to the procedures of criminal court, including
those basic Constitutional rights,34 because the focus on rehabilitation and flexible treatment outweighed a juvenile’s access to the due process afforded to
those cases seen before adult criminal court.35 In the 1920s, criticisms of the
juvenile court proceedings began to arise because of concerns that the juvenile
courts had no procedural formalities and judges had too much discretion in
treatment.36 It was not until the 1960s that the U.S. Supreme Court began to
recognize that juveniles under the juvenile court proceedings were not afforded
due process protections or effective rehabilitation services.37 This concern was
expressed in the 1967 Supreme Court decision, In re Gault.38
In re Gault was the landmark case that demonstrated the lack of due process
given to those juveniles subject to juvenile court proceedings.39 This case took
place in Arizona and involved a fifteen-year-old who allegedly made lewd and
30. Melli, supra note 13, at 380 (“The treatment had no relationship to the crime involved and
there was great flexibility” depending on lack of resources.).
31. Id. (noting several reasons why serious juvenile crime was not addressed and suggesting that
the emphasis on minor criminal conduct may be due to the relatively small amount of serious criminal
conduct committed by juveniles at the time the code was created or the likelihood that juvenile court
was not to have jurisdiction over those committing serious crimes).
32. Id. at 382.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 384 (“The assumption of the founders of the juvenile court had been that the state,
acting in the best interest of the child, would so fully protect the juvenile that there would be no need
for traditional due process protections.”).
35. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Access to Justice: Evolving Standards in Juvenile Justice: From
Gault to Graham and Beyond: Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53, 65–66
(2012).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 66–67.
38. Id. at 66; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
39. Birckhead, supra note 35, at 67.
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offensive phone calls.40 As a result of the phone calls, the juvenile was sentenced to six years and committed to an institution until he reached the age of
majority.41 Unlike the juvenile in Gault, an adult convicted of the same conduct
could be sentenced to no more than sixty days in jail under the corresponding
criminal code.42
In considering the due process rights afforded to those tried in criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court found the Juvenile Code of Arizona was invalid
because it did not provide “adequate notice of the charge and the hearing” and
gave no advice to the juvenile regarding his constitutional rights, such as the
right to counsel or right to confrontation and cross-examination, the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to a transcript of the proceedings, and the
right to appellate review.43 This landmark case opened the door to reconsidering the flexible and informal nature of juvenile court proceedings.44 It led to
many states implementing more formal procedures and guidelines similar to
those used in criminal court in the late 1970s and early 1980s.45
Following the Gault decision, the Supreme Court continued to define the
due process rights outlined in the juvenile court.46 In In re Winship, a case
heard in 1970, the Supreme Court ruled that the reasonable doubt standard applied in juvenile adjudications.47 However, in 1971, the Supreme Court also
refined juvenile due process rights in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania where the
Court held there was no constitutional right to a juvenile jury trial.48 The Court
reasoned a constitutional right to a jury would cause juvenile court to be too
adversarial because fairness did not require fact-finding through a jury.49 This
decision departed from Gault and limited the amount of due process rights afforded to juveniles in an attempt to remain focused on the original intent of

40. Melli, supra note 13, at 385; In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4.
41. Melli, supra note 13, at 385. Note that the age of majority was twenty-one at the time and the
juvenile’s family was also required to file a writ of habeas corpus in order to challenge the commitment
because the juvenile court at this time did not allow appeals. Id.
42. Id.
43. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 10.
44. Melli, supra note 13, at 386.
45. Id. (“Gault was followed by the incorporation of other criminal law protections into the procedures of the juvenile court—the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the prohibition
against double jeopardy.”) (citations omitted).
46. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970).
47. Id. at 368.
48. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550–51 (1971).
49. Preciado, supra note 14, at 580 (“The Court reasoned that to recognize a constitutional right
would change the nature of the juvenile court by making it too adversarial and formal, effectively going
against the original design of the early juvenile court’s intentions.”).
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juvenile court to be less formal and more rehabilitation focused.50
The due process reforms transformed the juvenile court system from a rehabilitation model to a more adversarial model.51 Not only did juvenile courts
begin to focus on criminal conduct and due process rights following landmark
decisions like Gault, but widespread concern that juveniles were being committed until the age of majority without successful rehabilitation demonstrated
the need to initiate proportionate sentencing.52 Therefore, many states began
setting definite terms of commitment, with possible court-ordered extensions
to ensure both equitable sentencing among juveniles and that juvenile sentences
are comparable to adult sentencing for similar criminal conduct.53 Under the
more adversarial, equitable form of juvenile justice, punishment began to reflect the seriousness of the offense while considering the criminal code’s sentencing limitations for the same crime if committed by an adult.54 This in turn
caused courts and legislatures to consider how to handle more serious juvenile
offenders, or rather, those offenders whose conduct was deemed too heinous
for the punishments available under the juvenile justice code.55
While more formal procedures and more proportionate sentencing have
been introduced in juvenile court proceedings to create a more criminalized juvenile court system, the juvenile system by nature is only meant to retain control over delinquent juveniles until they reach the age of majority.56 Therefore,
many states have created legislation that removes serious offenders from the
juvenile court jurisdiction and waives those offenders into the adult system to
ensure more appropriate sentencing.57
B. Wisconsin’s Juvenile Justice Code and Classification of Serious Juvenile
Offenders
Prior to 1996, the Wisconsin’s Children’s Code aimed to protect the best
50. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545.
51. Melli, supra note 13, at 387 (mentioning three significant juvenile court reforms, “the limitation of delinquency to criminal conduct, the introduction of prosecuting attorneys, and determinate
and proportionate sentencing”).
52. Id. at 389 (“Looking at the juvenile court system from the perspective of the criminal justice
system, reformers were concerned about the fairness of juvenile court open-ended disposition.”).
53. Id. (for example, in Gault, the minor was sentenced to six years although the maximum adult
sentence was a sixty-day jail sentence).
54. Id. at 390.
55. Id. at 390–91.
56. Id. at 392 (noting that “criminalization” of the juvenile court was a response to public concern
that the creation of a rehabilitation-focused juvenile court had failed, which resulted in an increased
use of criminal court jurisdiction for serious juvenile offenders and harsher penalties).
57. Id.

SNYDER-22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

276

12/28/16 2:22 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[100:267

interest of the child and help those children in need of protection.58 Following
legislative reform in July of 1996, the Juvenile Justice Code, which is codified
in Chapter 938 of the Wisconsin Statutes, began to shift focus by moving away
from rehabilitation and more towards punishment and juvenile accountability,
where delinquent offenders were considered separate from status offenders.59
The Code underwent remarkable changes, such as adopting the age of ten
to be the threshold for delinquency in order to establish accountability at an
earlier age and allowing seventeen-year-old juveniles to be prosecuted under
adult criminal court.60 Furthermore, the Code expanded original criminal jurisdiction to juveniles ten and older who “commit[] or attempt[] to commit firstdegree intentional homicide, or who have committed first-degree reckless homicide, or second degree intentional homicide.”61 Additionally, Wisconsin abolished the juvenile’s right to a jury trial.62 The Wisconsin Juvenile Justice Code
exemplifies the transition from the original purpose of the juvenile court to rehabilitate the youth and prevent continued criminal conduct to a more adversarial process that focuses on accountability.63 The transition has left gaps in
how to approach juvenile justice and the gap of greatest concern is how a court
is to treat serious juvenile offenders and whether original adult court jurisdiction is the answer.64
58. Preciado, supra note 14, at 584–85.
Prior to July 1, 1996, the juvenile code was listed under Chapter 48 of the
Wisconsin Statutes, which maintained the same legislative intent for all youths,
whether labeled “child victim” or “juvenile offender.” As of July 1, 1996, the
Code was renamed the Juvenile Justice Code and now resides as Chapter 938, a
largely symbolic move that has pushed juveniles next to the Criminal Code, serving as a warning to juveniles that “they’re almost there.”
Id. at 585.
59. Id. at 585–86. (“The JJC makes an effort to deal only with juvenile delinquency and not
commingle delinquent juveniles, or those who violate the law, with those juveniles who are in need of
protection. Juveniles in need of protection are not carried over into Chapter 938, but are left behind in
Chapter 48 of the Children’s Code.”). Note that status offender refers to an offense that is punishable
because the offender is a juvenile where the same offense would not be subject to a criminal charge if
the offender was an adult. See WIS. STAT. § 938.999 (2013–2014).
60. Preciado, supra note 14, at 586 (“[S]eventeen, as opposed to eighteen, ‘would benefit early
intervention programs and impose greater accountability for the most mature juveniles who violate
criminal laws.’”).
61. Id. (noting that the decrease in age from twelve to ten has “[t]he effect [] that a ten-year-old
can now be held delinquent, whereas previously he or she would have been considered in need of
protection”).
62. Id. at 587 (stating that jury trials are expensive and are often used for negotiation of pleas,
“which interferes with the rehabilitation and personal accountability goals of the juvenile justice system”).
63. Melli, supra note 13, at 392.
64. See generally Breann Boggs et al., Treatment of Juveniles in the Wisconsin Criminal Court
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III. JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION VERSUS ORIGINAL ADULT JURISDICTION
IN WISCONSIN
A. Waiver and Reverse Waiver Proceedings
Waiver and reverse waiver proceedings are a vital part of due process.65
The transfer of juveniles to criminal court to be prosecuted under the adult criminal code has continuously been justified by finding that the juvenile court is
not capable of handling those juvenile offenders who commit serious crimes
and determining that handling those juveniles under an adult criminal court is
best because the criminal court can impose harsher punishments.66 This transfer policy was enacted in a large majority of states, including Wisconsin.67 Further, states, like Wisconsin, made the transfer procedures easier by establishing
“offense-based, categorical, and absolute alternatives to individualized, offender-oriented waiver proceedings in the juvenile court” or by lowering the
age at which a juvenile is transferred automatically to adult criminal court jurisdiction.68
In Wisconsin, section 938.183(1) governs whether the adult court has exclusive original jurisdiction over juveniles.69 As mentioned previously, a juvenile that has reached the age of seventeen at the time of the crime is prosecuted
as an adult for any violations of the law.70 However, juveniles younger than
seventeen may be prosecuted as adults in criminal court as required by Wisconsin Statutes section 938.183.71
System: An Analysis of Potential Alternatives, Robert M. La Follette School of Public Affairs
(2008),
https://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/images/publications/workshops/2008-juvenile.pdf
[https://perma.cc/76XJ-CXSB]. See also Streit, supra note 15, at 43; Preciado, supra note 14, at 586–
87.
65. See generally Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
66. Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 CRIME &
JUST. 81, 81–82 (2000).
67. Id.; Melli supra note 13, at 392 (“A recently enacted provision of the juvenile delinquency
statutes in Wisconsin is a good example of the trend to a criminalized approach to juveniles.”).
68. Bishop, supra note 66, at 84.
69. WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1).
70. 9 CHRISTINE WISEMAN & MICHAEL TOBIN, WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES, CRIMINAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 10:1 (2d ed. 2015).
71. Id.; WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1):
(1) JUVENILES UNDER ADULT COURT JURISDICTION. Notwithstanding
ss. 938.12 (1) and 938.18, courts of criminal jurisdiction have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all of the following:
(a) A juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent and who is alleged to
have violated s. 940.20 (1) or 946.43 while placed in a juvenile correctional
facility, a juvenile detention facility, or a secured residential care center for
children and youth or who has been adjudicated delinquent and who is alleged
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Pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 938.183, any juvenile accused of
battery or assault while in custody or any juvenile over the age of ten who is
charged with attempted first-degree homicide, first-degree reckless homicide,
or second-degree intentional homicide will be subject to the original jurisdiction of the criminal court.72 Additionally, if a juvenile commits a crime after
waiving juvenile court jurisdiction, during waiver proceedings, or after the
adult criminal court had already exercised original jurisdiction over the juvenile
the criminal court will retain jurisdiction.73
Unlike delinquency proceedings within juvenile court, a juvenile prosecuted in adult criminal court is subject to those penalties and punishments outlined by the criminal code.74 Often, the sentencing associated with the criminal
code is significantly harsher than the sentencing options available in juvenile
court.75 This difference in sentencing has led courts to adopt a waiver procedure
where the juvenile court is able to assess the facts of the crime, the relevant
waiver factors, and determine if the offender will be best served under the criminal code.76

to have committed a violation of s. 940.20 (2m).
(am) A juvenile who is alleged to have attempted or committed a violation
of s. 940.01 or to have committed a violation of s. 940.02 or 940.05 on or after
the juveniles 10th birthday.
(ar) A juvenile specified in par. (a) or (am) who is alleged to have attempted
or committed a violation of any state criminal law in addition to the violation
alleged under par. (a) or (am) if the violation alleged under this paragraph and
the violation alleged under par. (a) or (am) may be joined under s. 971.12 (1).
(b) A juvenile who is alleged to have violated any state criminal law if the
juvenile has been convicted of a previous violation following waiver of jurisdiction under s. 48.18, 1993 stats., or s. 938.18 by the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter and ch. 48 or if the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter and ch. 48 has waived its jurisdiction over
the juvenile for a previous violation and criminal proceedings on that previous
violation are still pending.
(c) A juvenile who is alleged to have violated any state criminal law if the
juvenile has been convicted of a previous violation over which the court of
criminal jurisdiction had original jurisdiction under this section or if proceedings on a previous violation over which the court of criminal jurisdiction has
original jurisdiction under this section are still pending.
72. WISEMAN, supra note 70.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Vielmetti, supra note 2 (discussing how sentencing options differ depending on whether the
girls being prosecuted in the Slenderman trial are under juvenile court jurisdiction or adult court jurisdiction, where the juvenile system allows a maximum of three years of punishment rather than a larger
sentence under adult criminal code jurisdiction).
76. WISEMAN, supra note 70, § 10:6.
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A “waiver of jurisdiction is a ‘critically important’ action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile” because the juvenile court has
original jurisdiction along with special rights and immunities over juveniles that
are unavailable in the criminal code.77
A landmark case demonstrating the impact of the waiver hearing is Kent v.
United States.78 In Kent, the Supreme Court held that a hearing must be given
to the juvenile prior to allowing the waiver order where an offender is entitled
to a “meaningful review” of the facts that motivate the waiver and a detailed
explanation of the conclusion of the court.79 Moreover, the Supreme Court held
that under prior precedent,80 the offender is entitled to legal counsel as well as
a hearing to meet the minimum due process rights afforded to juveniles.81 Following the Kent decision in 1966, the judicial waiver process in courts across
the country has become increasingly formalized where each juvenile is given a
formal hearing during which the waiver request is evaluated according to the
state’s explicit criteria.82 For instance, in Wisconsin, a juvenile that is subject
to a waiver hearing is afforded the same rights as a criminal defendant with the
exception of a jury and the rules of evidence.83
Pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes sections 938.18(4) and 938.18(1) and (5),
the waiver hearing involves a two-part inquiry within the juvenile court.84
Upon receiving a petition requesting waiver of jurisdiction, the juvenile court
determines if the proceedings have prosecutorial merit.85 If there is sufficient
evidence to demonstrate the juvenile “probably committed” the crime, the state
will meet the burden of proving prosecutorial merit.86 Then, the court considers
if the jurisdictional factors under Wisconsin Statutes section 938.18(1) are present.87
77. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). For instance, the court in Kent discusses
how juveniles under juvenile court jurisdiction are protected from publicity, are not jailed with adults,
and can only be detained until the age of twenty-one. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 561.
80. Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104, 106–07 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Watkins v. United States,
343 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Note that the due process rights available to juvenile offenders are
equivalent to the due process rights available for adult offenders under the criminal code. See id.
81. Kent, 383 U.S. at 561–62 (citing Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959)).
82. Bishop, supra note 66, at 88–89.
83. WISEMAN, supra note 70, § 10:2.
84. Id. § 10:5.
85. Id.; State v. Toliver, 2014 WI 85, 356 Wis. 2d 642, 851 N.W.2d 251.
86. WISEMAN, supra note 70, § 10:5. (“Thus, the juvenile court first determines whether the
matter has prosecutive merit under Wis. St. § 938.18(4), and then determines whether to waive its
jurisdiction under Wis. St. § 938.18(5), if indeed it found prosecutive merit to the charges.”).
87. WIS. STAT. § 938.18(1) (2013–2014) factors include the following:
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Once the court establishes there is prosecutorial merit and a jurisdictional
factor is met, the second part of the waiver inquiry is conducted.88 During the
second inquiry, the court determines whether to waive jurisdiction considering
the criteria outlined in Wisconsin Statutes section 938.18(5).89
Upon consideration of the criteria, if the court determines there is clear and
convincing evidence to demonstrate that it would be “contrary to the best interests of the juvenile or of the public to hear the case,” the judge can waive jurisdiction.90 Only upon completion of the waiver hearing will the adult criminal

(a) The juvenile is alleged to have violated s. 940.03, 940.06, 940.225 (1) or (2),
940.305, 940.31, 943.10 (2), 943.32 (2), 943.87 or 961.41 (1) on or after the juvenile’s 14th birthday.
(b) The juvenile is alleged to have committed a violation on or after the juvenile’s
14th birthday at the request of or for the benefit of a criminal gang, as defined
in s. 939.22 (9), that would constitute a felony under chs. 939 to 948 or 961 if
committed by an adult.
(c) The juvenile is alleged to have violated any state criminal law on or after the
juvenile’s 15th birthday.
88. WISEMAN, supra note 70, § 10:5. (“The second stage of the waiver hearing involves the juvenile court’s consideration of the criteria for waiver enumerated in Wis. St. § 938.18(5), and its determination to waive jurisdiction.”).
89. Id.; WIS. STAT. § 938.18(5) (2013–2014):
(5) CRITERIA FOR WAIVER. If prosecutive merit is found, the court shall base
its decision whether to waive jurisdiction on the following criteria:
(a) The personality of the juvenile, including whether the juvenile has a mental illness or developmental disability, the juvenile’s physical and mental maturity, and the juvenile’s pattern of living, prior treatment history, and apparent potential for responding to future treatment.
(am) The prior record of the juvenile, including whether the court has previously waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile, whether the juvenile has been
previously convicted following a waiver of the court’s jurisdiction or has been
previously found delinquent, whether such conviction or delinquency involved the infliction of serious bodily injury, the juvenile’s motives and attitudes, and the juveniles prior offenses.
(b) The type and seriousness of the offense, including whether it was against
persons or property and the extent to which it was committed in a violent,
aggressive, premeditated or willful manner.
(c) The adequacy and suitability of facilities, services and procedures available for treatment of the juvenile and protection of the public within the juvenile justice system, and, where applicable, the mental health system and the
suitability of the juvenile for placement in the serious juvenile offender program under s. 938.538 or the adult intensive sanctions program under s.
301.048.
(d) The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court
if the juvenile was allegedly associated in the offense with persons who will
be charged with a crime in the court of criminal jurisdiction.
90. § 938.18(6) (2013–2014).
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court be given exclusive jurisdiction over the juvenile’s proceedings.91 However, if the petition for a waiver is uncontested the court will consider the capacity of the juvenile to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily decide not to
contest waiver prior to evaluating the criteria outlined in Wisconsin Statutes
section 938.18(5).92
To retain flexibility over the juvenile’s criminal proceedings, the adult
criminal court may conduct a “reverse waiver” proceeding to determine
whether or not to transfer the case from criminal court to juvenile court despite
the criminal court’s original jurisdiction.93 In State v. Kleser, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that a juvenile has the right to a reverse waiver hearing
following the criminal court’s finding of probable cause to hold exclusive jurisdiction over the juvenile regarding the crime the juvenile was accused of.94
The criminal court must retain jurisdiction unless the juvenile, during the course
of the reverse waiver hearings, proves by a preponderance of evidence that each
of the following factors is present:
(a) [T]hat, if convicted, the child could not receive adequate
treatment in the criminal justice system;
(b) [T]hat transferring jurisdiction to the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 and 938 would not depreciate
the seriousness of the offense;
(c) [T]hat retaining jurisdiction is not necessary to deter the juvenile or other juveniles from committing the violation of
which the juvenile is accused [under the circumstances specified in s. 938.183 (1) (a), (am), (ar), (b) or (c), whichever is
applicable].95

91. WISEMAN, supra note 70, § 10:6.
92. Id. § 10:5.
Whether the state is required to present testimony beyond the delinquency
and waiver petitions to support the waiver determination during the second stage
of the inquiry depends, according to the newly-enacted provisions of Wis. St. §
938.18(4)(b) and (4)(c), on whether the juvenile contests the waiver. If the waiver
petition is uncontested by the juvenile, the court need only inquire into the juvenile’s capacity to effect a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of juvenile
court jurisdiction. If the court is satisfied that the juvenile’s decision not to contest
the waiver meets the traditional criteria, no additional testimony need be taken.
The court may make its determination to waive juvenile court jurisdiction on the
record before it, although its determination must reflect the criteria enumerated
in Wis. St. § 938.18(5).
93. Id. § 10:1.
94. State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶ 128, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 N.W.2d 144.
95. WISEMAN, supra note 70 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 970.032(2)).
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The Kleser court held that a juvenile must be able to offer evidence to satisfy his or her burden on all three elements, including evidence about the offense to put the act in context, but evidence cannot be offered to contradict the
charged offense.96 This reverse waiver hearing procedure was recently demonstrated in the Slenderman case, where the judge determined that the adult criminal court must retain exclusive and original jurisdiction over the two twelveyear-old girls because transferring jurisdiction to juvenile court would depreciate the seriousness of the pre-meditated offense.97 Following the decision, the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision leaving the
girls subject to the criminal court’s jurisdiction because of the seriousness of
the offense.98
The judicial waiver statutes often gave judges broad discretion in considering a multitude of eligibility factors, and while their discretion was limited by
the Kent decision, the factors are subjectively applied to each juvenile and the
decision as to what court holds original and exclusive jurisdiction affects the
sentencing options available if the juvenile is found guilty.99 The sentencing
options available differ so greatly between those juveniles placed under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the adult criminal court than those juveniles who remain in the Juvenile Justice Code that numerous law reviews have
discussed both the benefit and harm that may come from prosecuting children
who commit “serious” crimes under the adult system.100
B. Sentencing in Wisconsin: The Difference Between Juvenile Court
Sentencing and Adult Criminal Court Sentencing
A juvenile can be placed under adult court jurisdiction by judicial waiver,
automatic transfer, prosecutorial discretion, or because the adult court has original jurisdiction,101 as is in the Slenderman case.102 While states vary on how
to define the jurisdiction and purpose of juvenile courts, all states have enacted

96. Id. (stating that evidence to contradict the offense may not be presented at the reverse waiver
hearing but is permitted at the preliminary examination).
97. Vielmetti, supra note 2.
98. Associated Press, Wisconsin Girls Should Be Tried as Adults in Slender Man Attack, Appeals Court Rules, FOX NEWS U.S. (July 27, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/07/27/wiscons
in-girls-lose-appeal-in-slender-man-attack.html [https://perma.cc/59TH-XBUJ].
99. Bishop, supra note 66, at 88–89.
100. Id. at 84–85; Melli, supra note 13, at 392; Streit, supra note 15, at 39.
101. Bree Langemo, Serious Consequences for Serious Juvenile Offenders: Do Juveniles Belong
in Adult Court?, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 141, 141 (2004).
102. Vielmetti, supra note 2.
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some waiver laws that allow juveniles to fall under adult criminal court jurisdiction based on age or seriousness of their offense.103 As a result, juveniles
prosecuted under a state’s juvenile code will experience a number of procedural
differences than a juvenile prosecuted under the adult criminal code.104
First, a juvenile in adult criminal court will experience longer, more drawn
out proceedings where their anonymity and confidentiality will not be protected.105 A juvenile in juvenile court will remain anonymous and information
will be confidential and his or her civil rights, such as the right to vote, will not
be affected.106 Second, juveniles under both systems are given due process
rights, including the right to counsel, but only juveniles prosecuted in the adult
system will have a right to a jury.107 Third, the juvenile system includes flexibility to terminate or extend supervision as a result of a juvenile offender’s response to his or her initial confinement.108 Last, and potentially most significant, the sentencing and punishments available to judges are determined by the
code under which the juvenile is being prosecuted.109
The juvenile code, despite its increased focus on punishment, takes a more
rehabilitative and deterrent approach, which limits a judge’s power to impose
lengthy incarceration sentences.110 On the other hand, the adult criminal code
exposes a juvenile to longer, harsher sentences often mandated by statute,
which results in the juvenile spending time incarcerated with adults in state

103. Langemo, supra note 101, at 141 (“To accomplish this goal [of punishing and deterring
juvenile crime], states have made it easier to waive juvenile defendants into adult court by utilizing
one of three methods: judicial waiver, automatic transfer, or prosecutorial discretion.”).
104. Id. at 145.
105. Id. at 151–52.
106. Id. at 152.
107. Id. at 151–52.
108. Streit, supra note 15, at 40.
109. Langemo, supra note 101, at 154 (“While some states consider youthfulness as a mitigating
factor, it is only one factor of many considered when imposing a sentence and is within the judge’s
discretion. Under federal sentencing guidelines, youthfulness, as a mitigating factor, is explicitly rejected.”).
110. Id. at 153.
The majority of states permit the imposition of life without parole or even mandate it upon conviction of juveniles in adult court. For example, in Washington,
eight-year-olds can be subject to life without parole, and ten-year-olds in Vermont can also be sentenced to life without parole if convicted in adult court. In
Florida, Lionel Tate, at twelve years old, killed a playmate and was tried in adult
court and convicted of first-degree murder. The conviction carries a mandatory
life without parole sentence.
Note, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court has invalidated statutes that mandate life without parole
for juveniles.
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prisons.111 While state statutes vary on the sentencing options available to a
judge regarding juveniles prosecuted for serious crimes either in criminal court
or in juvenile court, this Comment will only discuss the sentencing options
available to judges within Wisconsin regarding those juveniles who are eligible
for adult criminal court proceedings based on age and seriousness of the offense.112
C. Sentencing in Light of the Serious Juvenile Offender Program
The Wisconsin Juvenile Justice Code assumes juvenile offenders will
quickly improve their behaviors through rehabilitation-focused programs, and
as a result the usual disposition length is one year with the possibility of annual
reviews.113 For juveniles who commit more serious offenses but remain under
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, Wisconsin has a Serious Juvenile Offender
Program that allows a juvenile to stay in custody for up to three years.114 Alternatively, a juvenile who is retained under the adult criminal court’s jurisdiction
faces long periods of incarceration with less focus on rehabilitation.115 To understand how dramatically the sentencing may differ under the two court systems, the Slenderman case, as discussed earlier, can serve as an example.116
Two twelve-year-old girls were charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide in Wisconsin, a serious “Class B” offense that automatically
places the girls under adult criminal court jurisdiction pursuant to Wisconsin
Statutes section 938.183(1)(am).117 In a reverse waiver hearing that aimed to
place the girls back under juvenile court jurisdiction, the trial court judge ruled
that a three-year incarceration with supervision until age eighteen in the juvenile justice system was not sufficient punishment.118 Specifically, the judge
expressed concern over the inability to supervise the girls after they reach the
age of majority and how a lighter sentence under the Juvenile Justice Code may
111. Id. at 152–53.
112. Bishop, supra note 66, at 115.
113. Streit, supra note 15, at 39.
The juvenile system assumes that offenders will make fairly rapid developmental
improvements with the assistance of appropriate rehabilitation programs. The
normal disposition length in juvenile court is one year, with the possibility of
annual reviews if the targeted changes have not yet occurred. For the most serious
offenses, initial dispositions can be to a multiphase Serious Juvenile Offender
Program . . . .
114. Id. at 39–40; WIS. STAT. § 938.538.
115. Streit, supra note 15, at 39.
116. Vielmetti, supra note 2.
117. Id.; WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1)(am).
118. Vielmetti, supra note 2.
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depreciate the seriousness of the offense and may not deter or protect the public
from future crimes.119
Under the Juvenile Justice Code in Wisconsin, the type of offense committed by the juvenile determines the classification of the offense, which dictates
the sentencing options available to the presiding judge.120 A juvenile charged
with first-degree intentional homicide falls under a “Class A” distinction,
whereas a juvenile charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide,
second-degree intentional homicide, or first-degree reckless homicide is
viewed as a “Class B” distinction.121 While the Serious Juvenile Offender Program in Wisconsin covers both “Class A” and “Class B” offenses, the available
sentencing options differ.122 The two twelve-year-old girls, as “Class B” offenders, could receive a maximum sentence of three years in secure custody
with supervision until age eighteen under Wisconsin’s Serious Juvenile Offender Program.”123 However, if either girl was classified as a “Class A” juvenile offender she could be held in secure custody in a juvenile correctional facility up until her twenty-fifth birthday.124 This limit on supervision often leads
to an adult court retaining exclusive jurisdiction because it finds a longer sentence is necessary to not only deter the juvenile but to protect the public.125
For a juvenile under adult criminal court jurisdiction, the sentencing available for first-degree intentional homicide would not necessarily be limited to
secure custody until the age of twenty-five but would more likely result in a
longer sentence.126 In Wisconsin, first-degree intentional homicide is a “Class
A” felony that carries a mandatory life sentence.127 A twelve-year-old juvenile
charged with intentional first-degree homicide is automatically subject to adult
criminal court jurisdiction and assuming the juvenile is not reverse waived to
juvenile court, the juvenile will be subject to that mandatory life sentence.128

119. Id. (noting this fear was also expressed as a factor in the court of appeals decision to affirm
the trial court judge’s ruling).
120. § 940.01(1)(a); § 939.32(1)(a).
121. § 938.538(3)(a)(1); § 938.538(3)(a)(1m); § 939.32(1)(a); § 940.01(1)(a).
122. § 939.32(1)(a); § 940.01(1)(a).
123. § 939.32(1)(a); § 938.538(3)(a)(1).
124. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m); § 940.01(1)(a); Streit, supra note 15, at 40 (stating that the maximum
sentences for adults are increasing in length so the disparity in confinement between juvenile court and
adult court has grown making it easier to move more juveniles to adult court jurisdiction).
125. Vielmetti, supra note 2.
126. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m); § 940.01(1)(a); Streit, supra note 15, at 40.
127. § 939.50(3)(a); § 940.01(1)(a). See State v. Deal, 2010AP1804-CR, 2011 Wis. App. LEXIS
753 at *9–10 (September 20, 2011).
128. § 939.50(3)(a).
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While the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons prevented the imposition of the death penalty upon juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen,
Wisconsin courts have held that neither Roper nor the Eighth Amendment preclude a court from sentencing a juvenile who committed first-degree intentional
homicide to life imprisonment.129 Thus, in Wisconsin, juveniles convicted of
first-degree intentional homicide would be held in secure custody at a juvenile
correctional facility until their eighteenth birthday, at which time they would
be transferred to a state prison to serve the remainder of their sentence.130
Similarly, in the Slenderman case, the two twelve-year-old girls charged
with attempted first-degree intentional homicide under the adult criminal code
could be sentenced to a maximum term of up to sixty years of imprisonment if
they are convicted of the charged crime of attempted first-degree intentional
homicide.131
The maximum sentences available in adult criminal court proceedings result in significantly larger potential sentences than those maximum sentencing
options available in the juvenile court proceedings.132 The two twelve-year-old
girls, if convicted of attempted first-degree intentional homicide in the juvenile
justice system, could face up to three years of secure custody in a juvenile correctional facility with continued supervision until their eighteenth birthday.133
However, if the two twelve-year-old girls are convicted of attempted first-degree intentional homicide under the adult criminal code they could face up to
sixty years in prison.134 Three years of custody may seem to be a disproportionately light penalty for a twelve-year-old stabbing a friend nineteen times,
but on the other hand sentencing a juvenile to a large remainder of their life in
prison may seem disproportionately harsh.135 While there is no mandatory minimum for attempted first-degree intentional homicide and a judge may not necessarily impose the maximum term of imprisonment, there is no guarantee that
the troubled juveniles will not be subjected to a significant amount of time in
adult prison upon reaching the age of majority.136
In Wisconsin, the options presented above—a maximum sentence of three
years under the Juvenile Justice Code or a maximum sentence of up to sixty
129. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33,
¶ 77, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 797 N.W.2d 451.
130. Vielmetti, supra note 2.
131. §§ 939.32(1)(a), 939.50(3)(b).
132. § 938.538(3)(a)(1); § 939.50(3)(b); Vielmetti, supra note 2.
133. § 938.538(3)(a)(1).
134. §§ 939.32(1)(a), 939.50(3)(b).
135. Vielmetti, supra note 2.
136. § 939.50(3)(b).
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years under the adult criminal code—are the only options available to those
juveniles who commit “Class B” felony offenses.137 While Wisconsin is aware
of this gap in sentencing options, it has only remedied the gap for juveniles that
commit “Class A” offenses.138 The Serious Juvenile Offender program recognizes the need for expanded supervision and allows juveniles found guilty of
“Class A” offenses to remain in a juvenile correctional facility under secure
custody until their twenty-fifth birthday.139 This option is currently not available for those juveniles guilty of “Class B” offenses.140 Therefore, a juvenile
who is convicted of attempted first-degree intentional homicide in adult criminal court may be subjected to sixty years imprisonment to be carried out in state
prison after his or her eighteenth birthday but a juvenile that is convicted of
first-degree intentional homicide in juvenile court may be permitted to carry
out their sentence in a juvenile correctional facility until they turn twentyfive.141 This gap is what leaves the court attempting to decide whether to subject a “Class B” offender to a relatively short time in secure custody or to carry
out a harsh and lengthy sentence.142 This gap is what must be remedied to
allow juvenile court judges more discretion in sentencing “Class B” offenders.143

137. § 938.538(3)(a)(1); § 939.50(3)(b); Vielmetti, supra note 2.
138. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m); see Streit, supra note 15, at 40.
139. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m); see Streit, supra note 15, at 40.
140. § 938.538 (3)(a)(1).
141. § 938.538(3)(a)(1)–(1m); see Streit, supra note 15, at 40.
142. Vielmetti, supra note 2.
143. It important to note that other states have attempted to address the same gap within their
legislation. For instance, in Montana, the legislature created blended sentencing for juvenile offenders
under the Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act (EJPA). Robert E. Henderson, Comment, Blended
Sentencing in Montana: A New Way to Look At An Old Problem, 61 MONT. L. REV. 337, 339 (2000).
In 1995, the original EJPA was created to allow youth court judges to retain jurisdiction over juveniles
that committed “felony” offenses by imposing juvenile and disposition and adult sentences, where the
adult sentence was stayed unless the juvenile committed another offense. Id. In 1999, the EJPA was
amended to avoid subjecting juveniles to potentially longer sentences as the original EJPA did by
combining juvenile disposition with adult sentences. Id. The legislature believed the EJPA’s focus on
meaningful and serious consequences through extended juvenile jurisdiction would be an effective
forum for rehabilitation and treatment. Id. at 353. While the revised EJPA aimed to extend juvenile
jurisdiction for some offenses, it also removed some serious offenses, such as offenses “punishable by
death, life imprisonment, or a sentence of 100 years,” from the program recognizing that some juvenile
offenses should remain under adult criminal jurisdiction. Id. at 354. Despite its attempts, EJPA failed
to address the gap between those individuals that are able to benefit from the extended juvenile jurisdiction where the EJPA tends to extend jurisdiction to only those juveniles that commit property offenses. Id.
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IV. PROPOSAL: EXPAND SENTENCING OPTIONS FOR “CLASS B” SERIOUS
JUVENILE OFFENDERS UNDER THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CODE
The Wisconsin Juvenile Justice Code needs to be altered to allow presiding
judges to sentence “Class B” juvenile offenders to expanded supervision in juvenile correctional facilities under the Serious Juvenile Offender Program, similar to the sentencing options available for “Class A” juvenile offenders. Specifically, Wisconsin should extend the length of time in a juvenile correctional
facility available to “Class B” serious juvenile offenders until the age of twentyfive, as it is for “Class A” serious juvenile offenders.144 “Class A” and “Class
B” juvenile offenders are considered serious offenders and are subject to original adult jurisdiction for criminal proceedings under Wisconsin Statutes section
938.183.145
Wisconsin, through its reconstruction of the former Children’s Code into
the Juvenile Justice Code, has increasingly aimed to issue punishment, provide
protection for society, and afford juveniles due process rights.146 Despite this
change, the Serious Juvenile Offender Program is limited to juveniles ages fourteen or over who have committed or conspired to commit a variety of serious
crimes,147 and juveniles over the age of ten adjudicated for attempting to commit or committing a violation of section 940.01 or committing section 940.02
or section 940.05 offenses.148
Wisconsin Statutes section 938.538 outlines the guidelines of the Serious
Juvenile Offender Program, including the sanctions allowed for “Class A” offenders.149 The statute explicitly allows the court to hold a juvenile who committed an offense, considered a “Class A” felony if committed by an adult, in a
Type 1150 juvenile correctional facility until the juvenile reaches twenty-five
144. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m).
145. § 938.183(1)(am).
146. Preciado, supra note 14, at 575.
147. WIS. STAT. § 938.34(4h)(a) outlines what conditions must apply in order to place a juvenile
in the Serious Juvenile Offender Program:
(a) The juvenile is 14 years of age or over and has been adjudicated delinquent
for committing or conspiring to commit a violation of s.
939.32(1)(a), 940.03, 940.06, 940.21, 940.225(1), 940.305, 940.31, 941.327(2)(
b)4., 943.02, 943.10(2), 943.23(1g), 943.32(2),948.02(1), 948.025(1),
or 948.30(2) or attempting a violation of s. 943.32(2) or the juvenile is 10 years
of age or over and has been adjudicated delinquent for attempting or committing
a violation of s. 940.01 or for committing a violation of s. 940.02 or 940.05.
148. Id.
149. Id.; § 938.538(3)(a)(1m).
150. Pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 938.02, a Type 1 juvenile correctional facility is a correctional
facility excluding those under sections 938.533(3)(b), 938.538(4)(b), or 938.539(5) whereas a Type 2
juvenile correctional facility is a correctional facility that meets the criteria solely because of s.
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years old.151 However, this extension is only available to “Class A” juvenile
offenders whereas all other juveniles placed in a juvenile correctional facility
cannot be held for more than three years.152
Presumably, the reason for this distinction is that “Class A” felonies are
considered the most serious offenses.153 However, it does not seem appropriate
to allow “Class A” offenders guilty of first-degree intentional homicide to be
prosecuted under the Juvenile Justice Code, where they are placed under the
serious offender program giving judges the discretion to extend their supervision until the age of twenty-five, but to not allow judges the same option for
those “Class B” offenders guilty of attempted first-degree intentional homicide.154 As a result, “Class B” offenders guilty of a heinous and serious crime
with a less serious outcome are limited to three years under the Juvenile Justice
Code.155 To prevent these offenders from being rewarded with seemingly light
sentences, “Class B” offenders may be more likely kept under adult criminal
court original jurisdiction to ensure the judge has increased sentencing options
available to meet the factual circumstances of the juvenile offender’s case.156
This Comment aims to not only expose this gap in sentencing, but proposes
a slight change in legislation that would prevent the presiding judge from being
forced to accept a lower sentence than believed necessary under the Juvenile
Justice Code or subject the juvenile offender to the potentially harsh sentences
available under the adult criminal code. Other scholars have noted the potential
for harsh dispositions for young-adult offenders between the ages of seventeen
and twenty-four under Wisconsin’s current truth-in-sentencing regime and have
proposed concurrent non-truth-in-sentencing options to allow juveniles to earn
early release through good behavior.157 While proposals such as the one suggested above aim to give judges more discretion in their sentencing by remedying the amount of time to be served it does not expand the sentencing options
938.533(3)(b), 938.538(4)(b), or 938.539(5). Further, the Type 2 facilities are defined under WIS.
STAT. section 938.357(4) where a juvenile placed in a Type 2 juvenile correctional facility or secured
residential care center for children is under the supervision of the department of corrections and is
considered to be in custody, being subject to the rules and discipline of the department of corrections.
151. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m).
152. Id.
153. Melli, supra note 13, at 390; Hon. Dennis Barry, Juvenile Justice: A Wisconsin Blueprint
For Change, WIS. LAW., Mar. 1995, at 31.
154. § 938.538(3)(a)(1)–(1m).
155. Id.
156. Vielmetti, supra note 2.
157. Streit, supra note 15, at 41 (“For indeterminate sentences, judges issue a single total sentence and release is determined by the Parole Commission. The remaining unserved portion is parole
time; for serious violations, authorities may revoke the offender’s parole and order the offender returned to prison.”).
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for those offenders not considered “Class A.”158 Failure to expand the sentencing options beyond three years under the Juvenile Justice Code still leaves the
potential for harsh dispositions, which are generally objected to by the public.159
“Class B” offenders commit serious crimes, like “Class A” offenders, but
are effectively punished for failing to complete a homicide under sentencing
guidelines.160 While “Class A” juvenile offenders, like “Class B” juvenile offenders, are often subjected to original jurisdiction in the adult criminal code,
the sentencing available to judges regarding “Class A” offenders may make it
more likely the juvenile’s reverse waiver will be granted in order to allow the
juvenile access to rehabilitation and re-entry programs more prevalent in juvenile correctional departments.161 This line of reasoning was expressed in the
Slenderman reverse waiver decision by both the trial court judge and the court
of appeals.162 A “Class B” serious juvenile offender must be released after three
years in the juvenile correctional facility, but the same offender can be held for
a longer period of time to ensure proportionate punishment and protection of
the public under the adult criminal code.163 Thus, the reverse waiver considerations will not likely be deemed met as to justify transferring the juvenile back
under juvenile court jurisdiction.164 This problem would be eliminated if a
judge could instead find that “Class B” offenders be subjected to supervision
up until their twenty-fifth birthday in the Serious Juvenile Offender Program.165
In an era of rising violence and public concern regarding violent juvenile
offenders, the inclusion of “Class B” serious juvenile offenders under Wisconsin Statutes section 938.538 (3)(a)(1m) and allowance of judges to sentence
158. Id.
159. Id. at 40–41; § 938.538(3)(a)(1).
160. § 938.538(3)(a)(1)–(1m).
161. Lahny R. Silva, The Best Interest Is The Child: A Historical Philosophy For Modern Issues,
28 BYU J. PUB. L. 415, 436 (2014).
162. Vielmetti, supra note 2.
163. § 938.538(3)(a)(1); § 939.50(3).
164. Vielmetti, supra note 2.; WISEMAN, supra note 70; WIS. STAT. § 970.032, which requires
the criminal court to retain jurisdiction unless each of the following factors is present:
(a) That, if convicted, the juvenile could not receive adequate treatment in the
criminal justice system.
(b) That transferring jurisdiction to the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 and 938 would not depreciate the seriousness of the offense.
(c) That retaining jurisdiction is not necessary to deter the juvenile or other juveniles from committing the violation of which the juvenile is accused under the
circumstances specified in s. 938.183 (1) (a), (am), (ar), (b) or (c), whichever is
applicable..
WIS. STAT. § 970.032(2)(a)–(c).
165. § 938.538; § 970.032.
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“Class B” offenders to supervision beyond the three-year maximum imposed
on non-serious juvenile offenders will avoid the need to maintain adult jurisdiction in order to protect the public.166 Additionally, this modification to legislation will likely result in an increased number of juvenile offenders being
reverse-waived to juvenile court jurisdiction, where the juvenile system has
programs in place to help those juvenile offenders manage the years of adolescence that will be spent in custody.167 This proposal does not recommend that
judges change their considerations regarding waiver and reverse waiver procedures for serious juvenile offenders subjected to original adult criminal court
jurisdiction but rather it suggests the need for legislative change that would
generate greater flexibility in the sentencing of “Class B” juvenile offenders.
While not all “Class B” juvenile offenders should be reverse-waived to juvenile
court, those “Class B” offenders who would benefit from extended time with
the programs provided under the juvenile justice system could remain under
supervision instead of subjected to the harsh realities presented by placement
in an adult correctional facility.168
This Comment does not suggest that the juvenile court should retain jurisdiction over offenders that are near the age of majority simply because they
serve to benefit from the treatment available nor does it suggest that all “Class
B” juvenile offenders should be placed under the Serious Juvenile Offender
Program until their twenty-fifth birthday.169 Rather, this proposal suggests creation of a third sentencing option for “Class B” juvenile offenders to parallel
the sentencing options available for “Class A” juvenile offenders under the Serious Juvenile Offender Program. If the Wisconsin legislature were to adopt
this proposal, the Serious Juvenile Offender Program would allow judges to
sentence certain “Class B” offenders to extended placement beyond the age of
majority to protect the public and determine appropriate length in sentencing
while ensuring that those juvenile offenders can still benefit from the juvenile
correctional facility programs.170
V. CONCLUSION
Due to the nature of juveniles and the purpose of the Juvenile Justice Code,
Wisconsin should amend the Serious Juvenile Offender Program outlined in

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

§ 938.538; § 970.032.
§ 970.032; Vielmetti, supra note 2.
Streit, supra note 15, at 43.
§ 938.538.
Streit, supra note 15, at 43.
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Wisconsin Statutes section 938.538.171 Specifically, Wisconsin should expand
section 938.538 (3)(a)(1m), allowing “Class A” juvenile offenders to remain in
a juvenile correctional facility or secured residential care center until the age of
twenty-five to “Class B” juvenile offenders.172 This amendment will not mandate that “Class B” juvenile offenders remain under juvenile jurisdiction until
their twenty-fifth birthday nor will it extend original, exclusive juvenile jurisdiction to twenty-five.173 This amendment will fill the gap that exists in sentencing options available to judges regarding the supervision of juveniles below
the age of majority that commit serious crimes that would be considered a
“Class B” felony under the adult criminal code.174 By extending the ability to
hold both “Class A” and “Class B” serious juvenile offenders to the age of
twenty-five in juvenile correctional facilities, the offenses subject to original
adult court jurisdiction for criminal proceedings will have similar sentencing
options rather than being differentiated based on whether the violent offense
was attempted or completed.175
Beginning with the history of Wisconsin’s Juvenile Justice Code, this Comment explored the purpose of the Juvenile Justice Code in Part I. This Comment
differentiated between original, exclusive adult criminal jurisdiction in Part II
discussed the use of waiver and reverse waiver proceedings for juveniles who
commit serious offenses that potentially subject them to adult criminal court
jurisdiction. Part II also outlined the Serious Juvenile Offender Program and
highlighted the gap in sentencing options available to courts regarding “Class
B” juvenile offenders. Finally, Part III detailed a proposed “third option” in
sentencing “Class B” juvenile offenders that emulates the available options for
sentencing “Class A” juvenile offenders.
By exposing the gap in sentencing and suggesting an amendment to Wisconsin Statutes section 938.538 to fill the gap, this Comment hopes to avoid the
dilemma faced in the reverse waiver hearing in the Slenderman case due to
current Wisconsin legislation.176 Expanding supervision of “Class B” juvenile

171. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Vielmetti, supra note 2.
* Articles Editor of the Marquette Law Review, J.D. 2017 Marquette University Law School,
B.S. University of Wisconsin-Madison. I would like to thank Judge Bohren for inspiring me to
write a comment on the sentencing gaps that exist in the Juvenile Justice Code through his work
on the Slenderman trial.

SNYDER-22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

12/28/16 2:22 PM

SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS

293

offenders will remove the need to subject juveniles to adult criminal court jurisdiction and harsh sentences unless that reality is deemed necessary to protect
the public.
DANIELLE S. SNYDER*

